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The maximum and the addition of assignment games
Abstract: In the framework of two-sided assignment markets, we first consider that
among several markets, the players may choose where to trade. It is shown that
the corresponding game, represented by the maximum of a finite set of assignment
games, may not be balanced. Some conditions for balancedness are provided and,
in that case, properties of the core are analyzed. Secondly, we consider that players
may trade simultaneously in more than one market and then add the profits. The
corresponding game, represented by the sum of a finite set of assignment games, is
balanced. Moreover, under some conditions, the sum of the cores of two assignment
games coincides with the core of the sum game.
Key words: assignment game, core, nucleolus
JEL: C71, C78
Resum: En el context dels mercats a dues bandes, considerem, en primer lloc, que
els jugadors poden escollir on dur a terme les seves transaccions. Mostrem que el joc
corresponent a aquesta situacio´, que es representa pel ma`xim d’un conjunt finit de
jocs d’assignacio´, pot ser un joc no equilibrat. Aleshores proporcionem condicions
per a l’equilibri del joc i, per aquest cas, analitzem algunes propietats del core del
joc.
En segon lloc, considerem que els jugadors poden fer transaccions en diversos
mercats simulta`niament i, llavors, sumar els guanys obtinguts. El joc corresponent,
representat per la suma d’un conjunt finit de jocs d’assignacio´, e´s equilibrat. A me´s
a me´s, sota certes condicions, la suma dels cores dels dos jocs d’assignacio´ coincideix
amb el core del joc suma.
1 Introduction
Shapley and Shubik (1972) analize a class of two-sided markets making use of the
theory of cooperative games. In these markets there is a partition of the set of agents
in two sectors (let us say buyers and sellers, or firms and workers) and the model
assumes that the objects of trade are indivisible, in such a way that each seller has
a supply of exactly one item and each buyer a desire for exactly one item. The units
may be heterogeneous, so each buyer may place different valuations on the different
units. Moreover, in this model utility is identified with money and the free transfer
of money among all participants is allowed.
The real life market which motivates the assignment market is the market in
private homes. The set of agents is the union of two disjoint sets: a set of buyers M1,
each one of which wants to buy a house, and a set of sellers M2, each one of which
owns a house to be sold.
The jth seller values his house at cj ∈ R, while the ith buyer values the same house
at hij ∈ R. If i ∈ M1 buys the house owned by j ∈ M2 for p units, then j’s profit is
p− cj while the gain for i is hij − p. If hij ≥ cj, then a price favorable to both parties
exists. Otherwise no transaction will take place between these two agents. Hence the
profit of the coalition {i, j} is aij = max{0, hij − cj} ≥ 0, and A = (aij) i∈M1
j∈M2
is the
assignment matrix.
We will assume in this paper that the same set of agents (buyers and sellers) faces
different assignment markets. The first possibility, which is considered in Section 3,
is that each coalition of agents must choose only one of the markets to trade, and will
obviously choose the one where this coalition obtains a higher profit from an optimal
matching. This leads us to considering the maximum of assignment games. This
game may neither be an assignment game nor even be balanced. However, we obtain
a balancedness condition for the maximum of a finite set of assignment games, and
some properties of its core when it is nonempty.
In the second case, which is analyzed in Section 4, each coalition of agents must
optimally trade in all markets and then add the profits obtained. We thus consider
the addition of assignment games. Although this addition may not give an assignment
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game, its core is always nonempty and preserves some properties of the core of the
assignment game. For instance, all the agents on a same side of the market attain
their marginal contribution on a same core allocation. Finally, we show that, under
some conditions, the sum of the cores of two assignment games coincides with the
core of the sum of those games.
2 Preliminaries
Given a two-sided market, the assignment problem is defined by the triple (M1,M2, A)
where A = (aij) i∈M1
j∈M2
is a nonnegative real matrix. Solving the problem consists in
looking for an optimal matching in A. A matching between M1 and M2 is a subset µ
ofM1×M2 such that each k ∈M1∪M2 belongs at most to one pair in µ. If (i, j) ∈ µ
we also write j = µ(i) and i = µ−1(j). We will denote by M(M1,M2) the set of
matchings. We say a matching µ is optimal for the problem (M1,M2, A), in short µ
is optimal for A, if for all µ′ ∈ M(M1,M2),
∑
(i,j)∈µ aij ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ′ aij. The set of
optimal matchings of the problem (M1,M2, A) is denoted by M∗A(M1,M2). Given
S ⊆M1 and T ⊆M2, we denote byM(S, T ) andM∗A(S, T ) the set of matchings and
optimal matchings of the submarket (S, T,A|S×T ) defined by the subset S of buyers,
the subset T of sellers and the restriction of A to S × T . If S = ∅ or T = ∅, then the
only possible matching is µ = ∅ and, by convention, ∑(i,j)∈∅ aij = 0.
Given an assignment problem (M1,M2, A), Shapley and Shubik (1972) define a
related cooperative game with transferable utility (TU game), the assignment game
(M1 ∪ M2, wA), as follows. The profits of the mixed-pair coalitions, {i, j} where
i ∈M1 and j ∈M2, are given by the non-negative matrix A,
wA({i, j}) = aij ≥ 0,
and this matrix also determines the worth of any other coalition S∪T , where S ⊆M1
and T ⊆M2, wA(S ∪ T ), in the following way2
wA(S ∪ T ) = max{
∑
(i,j)∈µ
aij |µ ∈M(S, T )}. (1)
2Sometimes when coalitions are too large, we will write wA(S, T ) instead of wA(S ∪ T ).
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A transferable utility coalitional game (a game) is an ordered pair (N, v) where
N = {1, 2, . . . , n} is the set of players, and v : 2N → R is a real-valued function on
the set 2N of all subsets of N , with v(∅) = 0. If no cofusion regarding the set of
players arises, we denote the game (N, v) only by v.
A game is superadditive if v(S)+v(T ) ≤ v(S∪T ) for all S, T ⊆ N with S∩T = ∅.
Given two games (N, v1) and (N, v2), we write v1 ≤ v2 if v1(S) ≤ v2(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
and v1 < v2 if v1 ≤ v2 and v1(S) < v2(S) for some S ⊆ N .
A payoff vector is x ∈ RN , where, for all i ∈ N , xi represents the payoff to player
i. The set of payoff vectors that are efficient,
∑
i∈N xi = v(N), and individually
rational, xi ≥ v(i) for all i ∈ N , is the set of imputations I(v).
The core of a game is the set of payoff vectors x ∈ RN which, besides being
efficient, meet the coalitional rationality principle, that is
∑
i∈S xi ≥ v(S) for all
S ⊂ N . So, if a core allocation x is proposed, then no coalition S has an incentive
to split off from the grand coalition N . Given a game (N, v), the excess of coalition
S at imputation x is ev(S, x) = v(S)−∑i∈S xi. Notice that all core allocations have
nonpositive excess at any imputation.
From the definition of the assignment game, it is easy to see that it is a super-
additive game. In fact, wA can be characterized as the smallest superadditive set
function on M1 ∪M2 such that the worth of the mixed-pair coalitions is given by the
matrix A and individual coalitions have worth zero.
Shapley and Shubik (1972) also show that the core of an assignment game is
always nonempty. This core is the set of payoff vectors (u, v) ∈ RM1 ×RM2 that, in
addition to being efficient (
∑
i∈M1 ui +
∑
j∈M2 vj = wA(M1 ∪M2)) and individually
rational (ui ≥ 0, vj ≥ 0), satisfy coalitional rationality for mixed pair coalitions
(ui + vj ≥ aij for all (i, j) ∈M1 ×M2). As a consequence, for any optimal matching
µ ∈ M(M1,M2), ui + vj = aij for all (i, j) ∈ µ and ui = 0 and vj = 0 if i ∈ M1 and
j ∈M2 are unmatched by µ.
Moreover, the core of the assignment game has a lattice structure. That is, if
(u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ C(wA) and u∗i = max{ui, u′i} for all i ∈ M1 and v∗j = min{vj, v′j}
for all j ∈ M2, then (u∗, v∗) ∈ C(wA). Similarly, if u∗i = min{ui, u′i} for all i ∈ M1
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and v∗j = max{vj, v′j} for all j ∈ M2, then (u∗, v∗) ∈ C(wA). Thus, there exists a
buyers-optimal core allocation where each buyer attains her maximum core payoff and
each seller his minimum one and there exists a sellers-optimal core allocation where
each seller attains his maximum core payoff and each buyer her minimum one. We
denote these two particular extreme points by (u, v) and (u, v). Demange (1982) and
Leonard (1983) show that the maximum core payoff of any agent in an assignment
game is her or his marginal contribution:
ui = wA(M1 ∪M2)− wA(M1 ∪M2\{i}) for all i ∈M1 and
vj = wA(M1 ∪M2)− wA(M1 ∪M2\{j}) for all j ∈M2.
As a consequence, for all µ ∈M∗A(M1,M2), the minimum core payoff of a buyer i
matched by µ is ui = wA(M1∪M2\{µ(i)})−wA(M1∪M2\{i, µ(i)}). Similarly, if j is
matched by µ, vj = wA(M1 ∪M2\{µ−1(j)})−wA(M1 ∪M2\{µ−1(j), j}). Otherwise,
if i or j are unmatched, then ui = vj = 0.
The nucleolus of a cooperative game (N, v) is a well known single-valued solution
concept introduced by Schmeidler (1969) as the unique payoff vector ν(v) that lexi-
cographically minimizes the vector of nonincreasingly-ordered excesses over the set of
imputations. That is to say θ(ν(v)) ≤L θ(x) for all x ∈ I(v) where θk(x) = ev(Sk, x)
and {S1, S2, . . . , S2n−2} is the set of all nonempty coalitions in N , different from N ,
ordered in such a way that ev(Sk, x) ≥ ev(Sk+1, x).
For those games with a nonempty core, the nucleolus is a core allocation. More-
over, Solymosi and Raghavan (1994) provide a specific algorithm to compute the
nucleolus of an assignment game.
3 The maximum of assignment games
Given a finite collection of assignment games {(M1∪M2, wAk)}k=1,2,...,r, we define the
game (M1 ∪M2, wm) as the maximum of the r assignment games,
wm = max{wA1 , wA2 , . . . , wAr}.
That is, for all S ⊆M1 ∪M2, wm(S) = max{wA1(S), . . . , wAr(S)}.
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Our first remark is that the maximum of two assignment games may not be an
assignment game.
Example 1. Consider the 2× 2-assignment games defined by the matrices
A =
 2 0
0 1
 B =
 1 0
0 2

Let (M1∪M2, wm) be the maximum of the two assignment games, wm = max{wA, wB}.
Then wm({1, 3}) = wm({2, 4}) = 2, while wm({1, 2, 3, 4}) = 3. So, the game is not su-
peradditive since wm({1, 3}) +wm({2, 4})  wm({1, 2, 3, 4}). Since every assignment
game is a superadditive game, we conclude that not every maximum of assignment
games is an assignment game.
Let (M1 ∪ M2, wm) be a maximum of a finite set of assignment games: wm =
max
k=1,...,r
{wAk} where, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , r}, Ak = (akij) i∈M1
j∈M2
. Define the matrix Am =
max{A1, A2, . . . , Ar}. That is Am = (amij ) i∈M1
j∈M2
such that, for all (i, j) ∈ M1 ×M2,
amij = max
k=1,...,r
{akij}. Let now (M1 ∪M2, wAm) be the corresponding assignment game.
The game (M1 ∪M2, wm) does not coincide in general with the assignment game
(M1 ∪M2, wAm), since we have just seen that wm may not be superadditive. Never-
theless, these two games are tightly related. To show it, we must recall the definition
of the superadditive cover of an arbitrary coalitional game.
Let (N, v) be an arbitrary game, maybe non-superadditive. We can define another
game (N, v˜) which is the minimum superadditive game over the same set of players
such that v˜ ≥ v. This game (N, v˜) is called the superadditive cover of the game
(N, v). It can be proved that, for any coalition S,
v˜(S) = max
P∈PS
∑
Ti∈P
v(Ti) (2)
where PS is the set of partitions of S. In case (N, v) is already a superadditive game,
then its superadditive cover coincides with it.
Proposition 1. Let (M1 ∪ M2, wAk) for k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} be a finite set of as-
signment games, and wm = max{wA1 , wA2 , . . . , wAr}. Let (M1 ∪ M2, wAm), with
Am = max{A1, A2, . . . , Ar}, be the assignment game defined by the matrix Am. Then,
(M1 ∪M2, wAm) is the superadditive cover of (M1 ∪M2, wm).
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Proof. Since amij ≥ akij for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, wm(S) ≤ wAm(S) for every S ⊆
M1 ∪M2. On the other hand, wAm is a superadditive game since every assignment
game is superadditive.
Let us see that wAm is the minimum superadditive game w such that wm ≤ w.
Assume w superadditive is such that wm ≤ w < wAm . Then, there exists a coalition
S ⊆M1 ∪M2 such that
w(S) < wAm(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
wAm({i, j}) +
∑
k not matched
by µ∗
S
wAm({k})
=
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
w({i, j}) +
∑
k not matched
by µ∗
S
w({k}),
where µ∗S is an optimal matching for the submarket (S∩M1, S∩M2, Am|(S∩M1)×(S∩M2))
and the last equality follows from the fact that wm({i, j}) = wAm({i, j}) and wm({k}) =
wAm({k}) = 0. This contradicts w being superadditive.
In fact, it follows straightforwardly that the following three statements are equiv-
alent:
1. wm is an assignment game.
2. wm = wAm .
3. wm is superadditive.
(3)
The fact that (M1∪M2, wAm) is the superadditive cover of (M1∪M2, wm) allows to
deduce some consequences on the cooperative solutions of the maximum of assignment
games, just by analyzing some properties of the superadditive cover of an arbitrary
coalitional game.
3.1. The core of the maximum of assignment games
Unlike the case of the assignment game, the maximum of a finite set of assignment
games may have an empty core. Let wm be the maximum of the two assignment games
considered in Example 1. Here, wm(M1 ∪M2) = 3. Then, if (u1, u2; v3, v4) ∈ C(wm),
it holds u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 = 3. On the other hand wm({1, 3}) = 2 and wm({2, 4}) =
2. Then, if (u1, u2; v3, v4) ∈ C(wm), we have u1 + v3 ≥ 2 and u2 + v4 ≥ 2. So,
u1 + v3 + u2 + v4 ≥ 4, which leads us to a contradiction. Thus, the core of wm is
empty.
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In order to give a condition for the maximum of a finite set of assignment games
to have a non-empty core, we need the following lemma that relates the core of an
arbitrary coalitional game with that of its superadditive cover.
Lemma 2. Let (N, v˜) be the superadditive cover of the game (N, v) and C(v˜) 6= ∅.
Then,
v˜(N) = v(N) if and only if C(v˜) = C(v).
Proof. Since the if part is obvious, we only need to prove the only if part. If v˜(N) =
v(N) and x ∈ C(v˜), then x(S) ≥ v˜(S) ≥ v(S) and x ∈ C(v). Thus, v also has a
nonempty core. On the other hand, if v˜(N) = v(N) and x ∈ C(v), then x(N) =
v(N) = v˜(N). Further, for all S ⊆ N there exists P ∈ PS such that v˜(S) =∑
Ti∈P
v(Ti) ≤
∑
Ti∈P
x(Ti) = x(S). Thus, x ∈ C(v˜) and therefore C(v˜) = C(v).
Theorem 3. Let it be (M1∪M2, wm) where wm = max{wA1 , wA2 , . . . , wAr} and (M1∪
M2, wAk) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r} is an assignment game. Let Am = max
k=1,2,...,r
{Ak} and
consider the assignment game (M1 ∪M2, wAm). Then,
C(wm) 6= ∅ if and only if wm(M1 ∪M2) = wAm(M1 ∪M2)
and, in that case, C(wm) = C(wAm).
Proof. First we prove the only if part. Let C(wm) 6= ∅ and take (u, v) ∈ C(wm).
Then, ui + vj ≥ wm({i, j}) = max
k=1,...,r
{akij} = amij = wAm({i, j}) for every i ∈ M1 and
j ∈M2.
Then, if µ∗ ∈M∗Am(M1,M2), we have wAm(M1∪M2) ≥ wm(M1∪M2) =
∑
i∈M1
j∈M2
ui+
vj ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗
ui + vj ≥
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗
amij = wAm(M1 ∪ M2), and we get wAm(M1 ∪ M2) =
wm(M1 ∪M2).
To prove the if part, assume wAm(M1 ∪M2) = wm(M1 ∪M2), and recall wAm is
an assignment game. Since by Proposition 1, wAm is the superadditive cover of wm,
by Lemma 2, we have C(wm) = C(wAm) and consequently C(wm) 6= ∅.
As a consequence of Theorem 3, the core of the maximum of a finite set of assign-
ment games, whenever it is non-empty, coincides with the core of another assignment
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market, that defined by the maximum matrix. Notice that (M1 ∪M2, wm) may be
balanced although not being an assignment game (the efficiency condition of Theorem
3 is enough to guarantee balancedness).
Given the maximum of a finite set of assignment games (M1 ∪M2, wm), we can
consider the subgame (S,wm|S), with S ⊆M1 ∪M2. It can be obtained as
wm|S = max{wA1|S , wA2|S , . . . , wAr |S}
where wAk|S is the assignment game defined by those rows and columns of Ak occupied
by agents in S. So, the subgame (S,wm|S) is again the maximum of a finite set of
assignment games. Then, it is balanced if and only if it has the same efficiency as
that of the game obtained from the matrix Am restricted to the rows and columns
only occupied by players in S. In other words, the subgame (S,wm|S) is balanced if
and only if wm|S(S) = wm(S) = wAm(S).
Therefore, the maximum of a finite set of assignment games (M1 ∪ M2, wm) is
totally balanced if and only if it is an assignment game.
Solymosi and Raghavan (2001) characterize those matrices that define an assign-
ment game with stable core. A square matrix A has a dominant diagonal if the entries
which correspond to an optimal matching µ are row and column maxima, that is to
say, ai∗j∗ ≥ ai∗j and ai∗j∗ ≥ aij∗ for all (i∗, j∗) ∈ µ and all i ∈M1, j ∈M2.
Given an assignment game (M1 ∪M2, wA) where null rows or columns have been
added if necessary to obtain the same number of agents on both sides of the market,
C(wA) is stable if and only if A has a dominant diagonal.
On the other hand, if the efficiency level is preserved, a game and its superadditive
cover have the same stable sets. To see that, notice first that if a game and its
superadditive cover have the same efficiency level and therefore the same imputation
set, the domination relation is preserved by the superadditive cover. This fact was
proved by Gillies (1959).
Therefore, the maximum of assignment games (M1 ∪M2, wm) has a stable core if
and only if the matrix Am has a dominant diagonal.
Notice that the maximum of two assignment games may have a stable core al-
though not being an assignment game, as the next example illustrates.
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Example 2. Let us consider M1 = {1, 2, 3} and M2 = {4, 5, 6} and let A1 and A2 be
the following assignment matrices.
A1 =

3 0 0
0 2 0
0 0 3
 A2 =

0 1 1
1 0 1
1 1 0

From these two matrices we obtain their maximum Am = max{A1, A2},
Am =

3 1 1
1 2 1
1 1 3

which has a dominant diagonal.
Let wm = max{wA1 , wA2}, where (M1 ∪ M2, wA1) and (M1 ∪ M2, wA2) are the
two assignment games with matrices A1 and A2 respectively. Let (M1 ∪M2, wAm)
be the assignment game obtained from the matrix Am. Then, the core of the game
(M1 ∪M2, wm) is non-empty since wm(M1 ∪M2) = 8 = wAm(M1 ∪M2), and also
stable.
On the other hand, wm({2, 3, 4, 5}) = max{0 + 2, 1 + 1} = 2, which is not the
same as wAm({2, 3, 4, 5}) = 1 + 2 = 3. By (3), wm is not an assignment game.
3.2. The nucleolus
We show that given a finite set of assignment games, if the maximum game (M1∪
M2, wm) has a nonempty core, then its nucleolus is not difficult to obtain since it
coincides with that of the related assignment game (M1 ∪M2, wAm).
We obtain this as a straightforward consequence of a result that, under balanced-
ness conditions, links the nucleolus of an arbitrary coalitional game to that of its
superadditive cover. To this end, we recall the definition of essential coalition.
A coalition S ⊆ N is essential for a game (N, v) if either it is a one-player coalition
or v(S) > maxB∈DS
∑
T∈B v(T ), where DS is the set of all partitions of S different
from {S}. It is proved in Huberman (1980) that for each inessential coalition S there
exists a partition B0 ∈ DS all of whose elements are essential such that
v(S) ≤
∑
T∈B0
v(T )
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and we will make use of this fact in the proof of Lemma 4. The main result in
Huberman (1980) is that if (N, v) is a balanced game and S an inessential coalition,
then S need not be considered in any computation of the nucleolus. We now prove
that a game and its superadditive cover have the same set of essential coalitions.
Lemma 4. Let (N, v) be a coalitional game and (N, v˜) its superadditive cover. Then,
1) if S is essential for (N, v˜), then v(S) = v˜(S).
2) coalition S is essential for (N, v) if and only if S is essential for (N, v˜).
Proof. Both statements are straightforward if S is a one-player coalition, so let us
assume S has more than one player. First we prove that if S is essential for (N, v˜),
then it holds both that S is also essential for (N, v) and that v˜(S) = v(S). Let S be
essential for (N, v˜), then
v˜(S) > max
B∈DS
∑
T∈B
v˜(T ) ≥ max
B∈DS
∑
T∈B
v(T ). (4)
If it happened that
v(S) ≤ max
B∈DS
∑
T∈B
v(T ),
then the game (N, v′) where, for all R ⊆ N ,
v′(R) =
 v˜(R) if R 6= SmaxB∈DS∑T∈B v(T ) if R = S
would also be superadditive and, by (4), v ≤ v′ < v˜, in contradiction with the fact
that (N, v˜) is the superadditive cover of (N, v).
This means that
v(S) > max
B∈DS
∑
T∈B
v(T ), (5)
that is, S is also essential in (N, v).
Moreover,
v˜(S) = max
B∈PS
∑
T∈B
v(T )
= max{v(S),max
B∈DS
∑
T∈B
v(T )}
= v(S)
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where the first equality follows from (2) and the last equality from (5).
It only remains to prove the “only if” part of statement 2). If S is inessential for
(N, v˜) then there exists B0 ∈ DS all of whose elements are essential and such that
v(S) ≤ v˜(S) ≤
∑
T∈B0
v˜(T ) =
∑
T∈B0
v(T )
where the last equality follows from statement 1) applied to coalitions T ∈ B0.
Then,
v(S) ≤
∑
T∈B0
v(T ) ≤ max
B∈DS
∑
T∈B
v(T )
which proves S is inessential for (N, v).
Now, as a straightforward consequence of Lemma 4 and Huberman (1980) we
obtain that, under balancedness assumptions, the game and its superadditive cover
have the same nucleolus.
Proposition 5. Let (N, v) be a balanced TU coalitional game, (N, v˜) be its superad-
ditive cover and let v(N) = v˜(N).
Then, ν(v) = ν(v˜).
Proof. Notice first that, from v(N) = v˜(N), both games have the same set of impu-
tations. Since C(v) 6= ∅ and only essential coalitions are relevant for the computation
of the nucleolus (Huberman, 1980), the nucleolus of (N, v) is the unique imputation
that satisfies θ′(ν(v)) ≤L θ′(x) for every x ∈ C(v), where θ′k(x) = ev(Sk, x), with Sk
being the r essential coalitions of the game (N, v) and ev(Sk, x) ≥ ev(Sk+1, x) for all
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r − 1}.
Since, from Lemma 4, both games (N, v) and (N, v˜) have the same set of essential
coalitions and moreover every essential coalition has the same worth in both games,
it follows
ev˜(Sk, x) = e
v(Sk, x)
for all x ∈ C(v˜) = C(v) and for all essential coalition Sk.
Then, ν(v˜) = ν(v).
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Corollary 6. Let (M1 ∪M2, wm) be balanced, with wm = max{wA1 , wA2 , . . . , wAr}
where, for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, (M1 ∪M2, wAk) is an assignment game. Let it be
Am = max{A1, A2, . . . , Ar} and let (M1 ∪M2, wAm) be the assignment game defined
by Am.
Then, ν(wm) = ν(wAm).
Proof. From Proposition 1, (M1 ∪ M2, wAm) is the superadditive cover of (M1 ∪
M2, wm) and then, by the balancedness assumption on wm, wm(M1 ∪ M2) =
wAm(M1∪M2). Now the statement follows straightforwardly from Proposition 5.
This is equivalent to saying that the nucleolus of a balanced maximum of assign-
ment games only depends on the matrix Am. And the nucleolus of (M1 ∪M2, wAm)
can be computed by an algorithm due to Solymosi and Raghavan (1994).
4 The addition of assignment games
In this section we continue the study of the algebra of assignment games by consid-
ering the sum of assignment games. Given a finite collection of assignment games
{(M1 ∪M2, wAk)}k=1,2,...,r, let (M1 ∪M2, w) be the game which is the sum of the r
assignment games, i.e. w(S) = (
r∑
k=1
wAk)(S) =
r∑
k=1
wAk(S).
Next example shows that the sum game (M1 ∪M2, w) defined above is not neces-
sarily an assignment game.
Example 3. Let M1 = {1, 2} be a set of buyers, M2 = {3, 4} a set of sellers and A
and B be the following two matrices
A =
 5 2
6 5
 and B =
 4 3
3 1
 .
Let wA and wB be the two corresponding assignment games and let w be their sum,
that is to say w = wA + wB. Then, w(M1 ∪M2) = wA(M1 ∪M2) + wB(M1 ∪M2) =
10 + 6 = 16 and for every i ∈ M1 and j ∈ M2, w({i, j}) = wA({i, j}) + wB({i, j}) =
aij+ bij. If w were an assignment game with associated matrix C, then cij = aij+ bij.
14
That is,
C = A+B =
 9 5
9 6
 ,
but the worth of the grand coalition in the assignment game (M1∪M2, wC) is wC(M1∪
M2) = 15, which contradicts that w = wC .
Thus, only under certain conditions the sum of assignment games coincides with
another assignment game. More precisely, a necessary and suficient condition for
the sum of r assignment games to be an assignment game is that for each coalition
S ⊆M1 ∪M2 there exists a matching in M(S ∩M1, S ∩M2) which is optimal for all
the matrices associated to the r assignment games. The necessity and sufficiency of
this requirement is proved in the next proposition.
Proposition 7. Let (M1 ∪M2, wAk), k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, be a collection of assignment
games. Let (M1 ∪M2, w) be the game such that w =
r∑
k=1
wAk .
Then, w is an assignment game if and only if for each coalition S ⊆ M1 ∪M2
there exists a matching µS ∈ M(S ∩M1, S ∩M2) which is optimal for all matrices
Ak, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}, that is to say, µS ∈
⋂r
k=1M∗Ak(S ∩M1, S ∩M2).
Proof. First we prove the “if” part. For each coalition S ⊆ M1 ∪M2, let us assume
there exists a matching µ∗S that is optimal for all matrices Ak, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}. Then,
for each coalition S ⊆M1 ∪M2,
w(S) =
r∑
k=1
wAk(S) =
r∑
k=1
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
akij =
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
aij
where aij =
r∑
k=1
akij.
So, for each coalition S ⊆M1∪M2, µ∗S is also an optimal matching for matrix A =
r∑
k=1
Ak since, if there existed µ
′
S ∈M∗A(S∩M1, S∩M2) such that
∑r
k=1
∑
(i,j)∈µ′S a
k
ij =∑
(i,j)∈µ′S aij >
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S aij =
∑r
k=1
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S a
k
ij, there would exists k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}
such that
∑
(i,j)∈µ′S a
k
ij >
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S a
k
ij.
And it contradicts the fact that µ∗S ∈M∗Ak(S ∩M1, S ∩M2).
Thus, w is an assignment game and A its corresponding matrix.
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We prove now the “only if” part. Let the sum of a collection of r assignment
games, w, be an assignment game. Then, for every mixed-pair coalition {i, j},
w({i, j}) =
r∑
k=1
wk({i, j}) =
r∑
k=1
akij. (6)
Let A = (aij) i∈M1
j∈M2
be the matrix obtained by adding the r matrices, i.e. aij =
r∑
k=1
akij.
Then, by (6), this matrix is the one associated to the assignment game w and
w(S) =
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
aij =
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
r∑
k=1
akij =
r∑
k=1
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
akij (7)
where µ∗S is an optimal matching for coalition S with respect to matrix A.
On the other hand, for each matrix Ak and each coalition S, let µ
∗
S(Ak) be an
optimal matching for coalition S with respect to matrix Ak, µ
∗
S(Ak) ∈ M∗Ak(S ∩
M1, S ∩M2). Then, since w is the sum of the r assignment games,
w(S) =
r∑
k=1
wk(S) =
r∑
k=1
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S(Ak)
akij ≥
r∑
k=1
∑
(i,j)∈µ∗S
akij = w(S)
where the last equality follows by (7). Therefore µ∗S is an optimal assignment for
coalition S with respect to all matrices Ak with k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r}.
Although the sum of assignment games is not in general an assignment game,
the next corollary shows which kind of assignment games can be added to any other
assignment game such that the sum always remains in the class of assignment games.
First we need to recall the notion of the so-called glove market games. Let the
player set consist of two types of agents, M1 and M2, where M1 ∩M2 = ∅. Then, a
glove market game is defined by the characteristic function
v(S) = (min{|S ∩M1|, |S ∩M2|}) · k for all S ⊆M1 ∪M2, (8)
where k ∈ R+.
The game (M1 ∪M2, v) is called a glove market game because of the following
interpretation. Each player ofM1 owns a right-hand glove and each player ofM2 owns
a left-hand glove. If m1 members ofM1 and m2 members ofM2 form a coalition, they
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have min{m1,m2} complete pairs of gloves, each being worth k ∈ R+. Unmatched
gloves are worth nothing.
Glove markets are a special kind of assignment games. More precisely they are
those assignment games with constant associated matrix K = (kij) i∈M1
j∈M2
where kij = k
for all i ∈ M1 and all j ∈ M2. The characteristic function of the assignment game
corresponding to matrix K coincides with (8). Notice that in a glove market, for
each coalition S, every matching µS that is maximal with respect to inclusion, is an
optimal matching. This fact allows us to state the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Let (M1 ∪ M2, wA) be an assignment game. The sum game (M1 ∪
M2, wA + wB) is an assignment game for all other assignment game (M1 ∪M2, wB)
if and only if (M1 ∪M2, wA) is a glove market.
Proof. The “if” implication is straightforward by Proposition 7 since in the matrix
K all maximal matchings are optimal.
Let us prove now the “only if” implication. Supose that wA is not a glove market
game. Then, the associated matrix A = (aij) i∈M1
j∈M2
is not a constant matrix. So, there
exist two distinct elements in the matrix A. Therefore, there is a row or a column
of A with two distinct elements. Let us consider without loss of generality, that the
row corresponding to player i1 has the two distinct elements ai1j1 > ai1,j2 . Then, the
coalition S = {i1, j1, j2} is such that there exists a matching µS = {i1, j2} which is
not optimal. Let us now consider an assignment game (M1∪M2, wB) with associated
matrix B such that, for coalition S, the only optimal matchig in B is µS. Then, by
Proposition 7, it follows that wA + wB is not an assignment game.
4.1. The core
When we add different assignment games and the resulting game is another as-
signment game, its core is nonempty (Shapley and Shubik, 1972). We now remark
that the core of the sum of assignment games remains nonempty, although the sum
game is not an assignment game.
Remark 1. Let (M1∪M2, wAk), k ∈ {1, 2, . . . r}, be a collection of assignment games
and let (M1 ∪M2, w) be such that w =
r∑
k=1
wAk .
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It is a well known property of arbitrary cooperative games that the sum of the cores
of a finite collection of games with the same player set is included in the core of the
sum game (Shapley, 1971). Then,
r∑
k=1
C(wAk) ⊆ C(w),
and, since by Shapley and Shubik (1972), C(wAk) 6= ∅ for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , r},
C(w) 6= ∅.
We know, from Shapley and Shubik (1972), and it has been recalled in Section
2, that the core of an assignment game has a lattice structure with respect to the
partial order defined by one side of the market: given (u, v), (u′, v′) ∈ C(wA) we say
(u, v) ≥M (u′, v′) if and only if ui ≥ u′i for all i ∈ M . Next example shows that this
lattice structure does not hold for the core of the sum of assignment games.
Example 4. Let us consider the following two matrices,
A1 =

4 0 3
1 2 2
0 3 1
 A2 =

1 3 2
1 0 2
2 1 1

and let wA1 and wA2 be the corresponding two assignment games. Let w be the sum
game, i.e. w = wA1 + wA2 . Consider now the following two allocations, (u
′; v′) =
(4, 3, 5; 1, 2, 1), (u′′; v′′) = (6, 0, 1; 2, 3, 4). It is not dificult to check that both of them
belong to C(w).
Finally, define a new allocation (u, v) such that ui = max{u′i, u′′i } and vj =
min{v′j, v′′j }. So, (u, v) = (6, 3, 5; 1, 2, 1), which does not belong to C(w) since it
is not efficient:
∑
i∈M1 ui +
∑
j∈M2 vj = 18 > 16 = wA1(M1 ∪M2) +wA2(M1 ∪M2) =
w(M1 ∪M2).
Although the lattice structure of the core is not preserved by the addition of
assignment games, we show that, as it happens in the assignment game, each agent
achieves his or her marginal contribution in the core of the sum game and, moreover,
all agents on the same side of the market achieve their marginal contribution in the
same core allocation.
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Proposition 9. For all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . r}, let (M1 ∪M2, wAk) be an assignment game
and let (uk, vk) and (uk, vk), k ∈ {1, 2, . . . r}, be the corresponding buyers-optimal
and sellers-optimal core allocations, respectively. Let (M1 ∪M2, w) be the sum game,
w =
r∑
k=1
wAk . Then
i) (u, v) =
r∑
k=1
(uk, vk) is a core allocation of the sum game where each buyer
obtains her maximum core payoff which is her marginal contribution.
ii) (u, v) =
r∑
k=1
(uk, vk) is a core allocation of the sum game where each seller
obtains his maximum core payoff which is his marginal contribution.
Proof. Since (uk, vk) ∈ C(wAk) for all k ∈ {1, 2, . . . r}, then (u, v) = (
r∑
k=1
uk,
r∑
k=1
vk) ∈
r∑
k=1
C(wAk) and by Remark 1, (u, v) ∈ C(w).
Using the same arguments, it can be proved that (u, v) ∈ C(w).
It is well known that the most any player can attain in the core of any cooperative
game is his marginal contribution to the grand coalition. Moreover, if we consider the
assignment game (M1 ∪M2, wAk), the marginal contribution of a player i ∈M1 ∪M2
to the grand coalition is b
wAk
i = wAk(M1 ∪M2)−wAk(M1 ∪M2\{i}) and it is known
from Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983) that in the assignment game these marginal
contributions are attained for sure, b
wAk
i = u
k
i if i ∈M1 and b
wAk
i = v
k
i if i ∈M2.
The marginal contribution is preserved by addition: for all i ∈M1 ∪M2,
ui =
r∑
k=1
uki
=
r∑
k=1
b
wAk
i
=
r∑
k=1
(wAk(M1 ∪M2)− wAk(M1 ∪M2\{i}))
=
r∑
k=1
wAk(M1 ∪M2)−
r∑
k=1
wAk(M1 ∪M2\{i})
= w(M1 ∪M2)− w(M1 ∪M2\{i}),
which means that buyer i attains her marginal contribution in the core of the sum
game. The same holds for all seller i ∈M2.
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We then say that (u, v) is the buyers-optimal core allocation of the sum game and
(u, v) is its sellers-optimal core allocation. Beware that, since the lattice property is
not preserved in the core of the maximum of assignment games, v might not be the
vector of minimum core payoffs to the sellers.
We have seen before that the sum of the cores of a finite collection of assignment
games is included in the core of the sum game. The question now is if the converse
inclusion also holds. This question remains still open but at least we can give an
affirmative answer under certain conditions.
We show next that given two assignment games with the same set of agents and
such that two matchings can be found, each one of them optimal for one of the
markets, that have no common pair, then the core behaves additively. That is to say,
under these conditions the core of the sum game is the sum of the two cores.
Theorem 10. Let (M1 ∪M2, wA) and (M1 ∪M2, wB) be two assignment games with
corresponding matrices A = (aij) i∈M1
j∈M2
and B = (bij) i∈M1
j∈M2
such that there is an optimal
matching µ1 of A and an optimal matching µ2 of B with µ1 ∩ µ2 = ∅. Then,
C(wA) + C(wB) = C(w)
where w = wA + wB.
Proof. The inclusion ⊆ is proved in Remark 1. Next we prove the converse inclu-
sion. Let µ1 be an optimal matching for A and µ2 be an optimal matching for B
such that these two matchings have no pair in common. Assume without loss of
generality that |M1| = |M2| = m. Recall that by adding null rows or columns if
necessary, any assignment game can be transformed in an assignment game with as
many buyers as sellers and the core of the market is not modified, except for the fact
that null payoffs are assigned to the added dummy agents. Assume also, without loss
of generality, that µ1 = {(i, i)}i∈M1 and µ2 = {(i, i + 1)}i∈M1\{m} ∪ {(m, 1)}. This
means that A has an optimal matching µ1 in the diagonal, while µ2 has no optimal
matching pairs placed in the diagonal. Notice that an order can be established on
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the set of buyers and another one on the set of sellers such that the two fixed optimal
matchings are of the above kind.
In this proof we will denote the jth seller by j′ only when necessary in order to
distinguish him from the jth buyer.
Take (u, v) ∈ C(w). We want to see that (u, v) ∈ C(wA)+C(wB). That is to say,
there exist (u1, v1) ∈ C(wA) and (u2, v2) ∈ C(wB) such that (u, v) = (u1, v1)+(u2, v2).
So, given (u, v) ∈ C(w) we need first to solve the linear system of equations:

(1) ui = u
1
i + u
2
i for all i ∈M1,
(2) vj = v
1
j + v
2
j for all j ∈M2,
(3) aii = u
1
i + v
1
i for all i ∈M1,
(4) bii+1 = u
2
i + v
2
i+1 for all i ∈M1\{m},
(5) bm1 = u
2
m + v
2
1.
(9)
Notice that, since (u, v) ∈ C(w),∑
i∈M1
ui +
∑
j∈M2
vj =
∑
(i,j)∈µ1
aij +
∑
(i,j)∈µ2
bij =
∑
i∈M1
aii +
∑
i∈M1\{m}
bii+1 + bm1 (10)
Moreover, since the above system has one degree of freedom, it is possible to express
all the variables in terms of one of them, say u11. First we find u
1
m in terms of u
1
1:
u1m = um − u2m
= um − (bm1 − v21)
= um − bm1 + (v1 − v11)
= um − bm1 + v1 − a11 + u11,
(11)
where the first equality follows from (1) in the system (9), the second from (5), the
third from (2) and the last one from (3). Now we write u1m−1 in terms of u
1
1:
u1m−1 = um−1 − u2m−1
= um−1 − (bm−1m − v2m)
= um−1 − bm−1m + (vm − v1m)
= um−1 − bm−1m + vm − (amm − u1m)
= um−1 − bm−1m + vm − amm + um − bm1 + v1 − a11 + u11
= (um−1 + um) + v1 − (bm1 + bm−1m) + vm − (amm + a11) + u11,
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where the equalities from the first to the fourth follow, respectively, from the equalities
(1), (4), (2), (3) in (9) and the fifth one from (11).
We assume by backward induction hypothesis on k, 2 ≤ k ≤ m, that
u1k =
m∑
j=k
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k+1
vj −
m∑
j=k+1
ajj − a11 + u11. (12)
Note that, by (11), expression (12) is also valid for k = m if we assume that a
sumation over an empty set of indices has worth zero3.
Then,
u1k−1 = uk−1 − u2k−1
= uk−1 − (bk−1k − v2k)
= uk−1 − bk−1k + (vk − v1k)
= uk−1 − bk−1k + vk − (akk − u1k)
= uk−1 − bk−1k + vk − akk+
+
( m∑
j=k
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k+1
vj −
m∑
j=k+1
ajj − a11 + u11
)
=
m∑
j=k−1
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k−1
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k
vj −
m∑
j=k
ajj − a11 + u11.
Thus, u1k is given by expression (12) for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m.
Now by equation (1) in (9), for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m,
u2k = uk − u1k
= uk −
( m∑
j=k
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k+1
vj −
m∑
j=k+1
ajj − a11 + u11
)
= −
m∑
j=k+1
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k+1
ajj + a11 − u11;
(13)
by equation (3) in (9), for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m,
v1k = akk − u1k
= akk −
( m∑
j=k
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k+1
vj −
m∑
j=k+1
ajj − a11 + u11
)
= −
m∑
j=k
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k
ajj + a11 − u11;
(14)
3The same remark applies for expressions (13), (14) and (15).
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by equation (2) in (9) and (13), for all 2 ≤ k ≤ m,
v2k = vk − v1k
= vk −
(
−
m∑
j=k
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k
ajj + a11 − u11
)
=
m∑
j=k
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k
vj −
m∑
j=k
ajj − a11 + u11;
(15)
and finally, by (9), equation (1), u21 = u1 − u11, by the equation (3), v11 = a11 − u11,
and by the equations (2) and (3), v21 = v1 − v11 = v1 − (a11 − u11) = v1 − a11 + u11.
Notice that u11, u
2
1, v
1
1, v
2
1 also satisfy the expressions (12), (13), (14) and (15) for
k = 1.
We now impose u1k ≥ 0, v1k ≥ 0, u2k ≥ 0, v2k ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and we get
the following bounds for u11.
From (12) and u1k ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we get
u11 ≥ −
m∑
j=k
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k+1
ajj + a11 = Ak.
From (13), by imposing u2k ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we get
u11 ≤ −
m∑
j=k+1
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k+1
ajj + a11 = Bk.
From (14) and v1k ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we obtain
u11 ≤ −
m∑
j=k
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k
ajj + a11 = Ck.
And finally, from (15) and by imposing v2k ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ k ≤ m, we obtain
u11 ≥ −
m∑
j=k
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k
vj +
m∑
j=k
ajj + a11 = Dk.
All these lower and upper bounds can be summarized in
max
k∈{1,...,m}
{Ak, Dk} ≤ u11 ≤ min
k∈{1,...,m}
{Bk, Ck}. (16)
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Let us now see that such u11 can be found. It is quite straightforward that, for all
k ∈ {1, . . . ,m},
Ak = −uk +Bk ≤ Bk,
Ak = −akk + Ck ≤ Ck,
Dk = −vk + Ck ≤ Ck and
Dk = −vk − uk + akk +Bk ≤ Bk,
where the last inequality is equivalent to uk + vk ≥ akk which follows from the fact
that (u, v) ∈ C(w) and therefore uk + vk ≥ w({k, k′}) = wA({k, k′}) + wB({k, k′}) =
akk + bkk ≥ akk.
Next we will show that the inequalities in (16) also hold when the subindices are
different. Take k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and assume k1 6= k2.
We will prove that Ak1 ≤ Bk2 . Recall
Ak1 = −
m∑
j=k1
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k1+1
vj +
m∑
j=k1+1
ajj + a11
Bk2 = −
m∑
j=k2+1
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k2
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k2+1
vj +
m∑
j=k2+1
ajj + a11.
If k1 < k2, Ak1 ≤ Bk2 is equivalent to
k2∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1+1
vj ≥
k2∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
and this follows from (u, v) ∈ C(w) which implies
k2∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1+1
vj ≥ w({k1, . . . , k2}, {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2})
= wA({k1, . . . , k2}, {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2})
+wB({k1, . . . , k2}, {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2})
≥
k2∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{k1+1,...,k2} is a matching for the coalition
{k1, . . . , k2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2}, and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{k1,...,k2−1} is a
matching for the same coalition.
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If k1 > k2, Ak1 ≤ Bk2 is equivalent to
k1−1∑
j=k2+1
uj +
k1∑
j=k2+1
vj ≤
k1∑
j=k2+1
ajj +
k1−1∑
j=k2
bjj+1.
Now, by substracting from the efficiency condition (10),
k2∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1+1
vj ≥
k2∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1+
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1+ bm1
and this holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) and therefore
k2∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1+1
vj
≥ w({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′})
= wA({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′})
+wB({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′})
≥
k2∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 + bm1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{1,...,k2}∪{k1+1,...,m} is a matching for the coalition
({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}) ∪ ({1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′}) and µ′2 = {(m, 1)} ∪
{(j, j + 1)}j∈{1,...,k2−1}∪{k1,...,m−1} is a matching for the same coalition.
We now see that Ak1 ≤ Ck2 for all k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and k1 6= k2.
Recall that
Ck2 = −
m∑
j=k2
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k2
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k2+1
vj +
m∑
j=k2
ajj + a11
If k1 < k2, Ak1 ≤ Ck2 is equivalent to
k2−1∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1+1
vj ≥
k2−1∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1.
and it holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) which implies
k2−1∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1+1
vj ≥ w({k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2})
= wA({k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2})
+wB({k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2})
≥
k2−1∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
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since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{k1+1,...,k2−1} is a matching for the coalition
{k1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . , k′2}, and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{k1,...,k2−1} is a matching
for the same coalition.
If k1 > k2, Ak1 ≤ Ck2 is equivalent to
k1−1∑
j=k2
uj +
k1∑
j=k2+1
vj ≤
k1∑
j=k2
ajj +
k1−1∑
j=k2
bjj+1.
Now, by substracting from the efficiency condition,
k2−1∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1+1
vj ≥
k2−1∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1+
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1+ bm1
and this holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) and therefore
k2−1∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1+1
vj
≥ w({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′})
= wA({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′})
+wB({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {(k1 + 1)′, . . . ,m′})
≥
k2−1∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1+1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 + bm1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{1,...,k2−1}∪{k1+1,...,m} is a matching for the coalition
({1, . . . , k2−1}∪{k1, . . . ,m})∪({1′, . . . , k′2}∪{(k1+1)′, . . . ,m′}) and µ′2 = {(m, 1)}∪
{(j, j + 1)}j∈{1,...,k2−1}∪{k1,...,m−1} is a matching for the same coalition.
Now let us check that Dk1 ≤ Bk2 for all k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and k1 6= k2.
Recall that
Dk1 = −
m∑
j=k1
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k1
vj +
m∑
j=k1
ajj + a11.
Then, if k1 < k2, Dk1 ≤ Bk2 is equivalent to
k2∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1
vj ≥
k2∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
26
and it holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) which implies
k2∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1
vj ≥ w({k1, . . . , k2}, {k′1, . . . , k′2})
= wA({k1, . . . , k2}, {k′1, . . . , k′2})
+wB({k1, . . . , k2}, {k′1, . . . , k′2})
≥
k2∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{k1,...,k2} is a matching for the coalition
{k1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k′1, . . . , k′2}, and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{k1,...,k2−1} is a matching for the
same coalition.
If k1 > k2, then Dk1 ≤ Bk2 is equivalent to
k1−1∑
j=k2+1
uj +
k1−1∑
j=k2+1
vj ≤
k1−1∑
j=k2+1
ajj +
k1−1∑
j=k2
bjj+1.
Now, by substracting from the efficiency condition,
k2∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1
vj ≥
k2∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 + bm1
and this holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) and therefore
k2∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1
vj
≥ w({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′})
= wA({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′})
+wB({1, . . . , k2} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′})
≥
k2∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 + bm1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{1,...,k2}∪{k1,...,m} is a matching for the coalition
({1, . . . , k2}∪{k1, . . . ,m})∪ ({1′, . . . , k′2}∪{k′1, . . . ,m′}) and µ′2 = {(m, 1)}∪{(j, j+
1)}j∈{1,...,k2−1}∪{k1,...,m−1} is a matching for the same coalition.
Finally, let us prove that Dk1 ≤ Ck2 for all k1, k2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, k1 6= k2.
If k1 < k2, Dk1 ≤ Ck2 is equivalent to
k2−1∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1
vj ≥
k2−1∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
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and this holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) which implies
k2−1∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=k1
vj ≥ w({k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, {k′1, . . . , k′2})
= wA({k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, {k′1, . . . , k′2})
+wB({k1, . . . , k2 − 1}, {k′1, . . . , k′2})
≥
k2−1∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{k1,...,k2−1} is a matching for the coalition
{k1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k′1, . . . , k′2}, and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{k1,...,k2−1} is a matching for
the same coalition.
If k1 > k2, then Dk1 ≤ Ck2 is equivalent to
k1−1∑
j=k2
uj +
k1−1∑
j=k2+1
vj ≤
k1−1∑
j=k2
ajj +
k1−1∑
j=k2
bjj+1.
Now, by substracting from the efficiency condition,
k2−1∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1
vj ≥
k2−1∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 + bm1
and this holds since (u, v) ∈ C(w) and therefore
k2−1∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k1
uj +
k2∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k1
vj
≥ w({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′})
= wA({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′})
+wB({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′})
≥
k2−1∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k1
ajj +
k2−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k1
bjj+1 + bm1
since µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{1,...,k2−1}∪{k1,...,m} is a matching for the coalition
({1, . . . , k2 − 1} ∪ {k1, . . . ,m}) ∪ ({1′, . . . , k′2} ∪ {k′1, . . . ,m′}) and µ′2 = {(m, 1)} ∪
{(j, j + 1)}j∈{1,...,k2−1}∪{k1,...,m−1} is a matching for the same coalition.
To summarize, there exists u11 satisfying all inequalities in (16).
Take then u11 satisfying (16) and then find the corresponding u
1
k for k = 2, . . . ,m
and u2k, v
1
k and v
2
k for k = 1, . . . ,m from the linear system in (9). We must see that
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(u1, v1) ∈ C(wA) and (u2, v2) ∈ C(wB). That is to say, for all i ∈M1 and j ∈M2, we
must see that u1i + v
1
j ≥ aij and u2i + v2j ≥ bij.
First we consider the game wA. The optimal matching for the matrix A is µ1 =
{(i, i)}i=1,...,m and from the linear system we have u1i + v1i = aii for all i ∈ M1. We
show first, that u1i + v
1
k ≥ aik for all i, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m} such that i < k. By (12) and
(14),
u1i + v
1
k =
( m∑
j=i
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=i
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=i+1
vj −
m∑
j=i+1
ajj − a11 + u11
)
+
(
−
m∑
j=k
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=k+1
vj +
m∑
j=k
ajj + a11 − u11
)
=
k−1∑
j=i
uj −
k−1∑
j=i
bjj+1 +
k∑
j=i+1
vj −
k−1∑
j=i+1
ajj.
Thus, u1i + v
1
k ≥ aik with i < k is equivalent to
k−1∑
j=i
uj +
k∑
j=i+1
vj ≥
k−1∑
j=i+1
ajj + aik +
k−1∑
j=i
bjj+1
and it follows from (u, v) ∈ C(w) since
k−1∑
j=i
uj +
k∑
j=i+1
vj ≥ w({i, . . . , k − 1}, {(i+ 1)′, . . . , k′})
= wA({i, . . . , k − 1}, {(i+ 1)′, . . . , k′})
+wB({i, . . . , k − 1}, {(i+ 1)′, . . . , k′})
≥
k−1∑
j=i+1
ajj + aik +
k−1∑
j=i
bjj+1
because µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{i+1,...,k−1} ∪ {(i, k)} is a matching for the coalition {i, . . . , k−
1} ∪ {(i + 1)′, . . . , k′}, and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{i,...,k−1} is a matching for the same
coalition.
In case i > k, we also show that u1i + v
1
k ≥ aik. That is, from (12) and (14),
u1i + v
1
k = −
i−1∑
j=k
uj +
i−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 −
i∑
j=k+1
vj +
i∑
j=k
ajj.
Thus, u1i + v
1
k ≥ aik with i > k is equivalent to
i−1∑
j=k
uj +
i∑
j=k+1
vj ≤
i∑
j=k
ajj − aik +
i−1∑
j=k
bjj+1,
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and substracting from the efficiency, it is also equivalent to
k−1∑
j=1
uj+
m∑
j=i
uj+
k∑
j=1
vj+
m∑
j=i+1
vj ≥
k−1∑
j=1
ajj+
m∑
j=i+1
ajj+aik+
k−1∑
j=1
bjj+1+
m−1∑
j=i
bjj+1+bm1.
Since (u, v) ∈ C(w),
k−1∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=i
uj +
k∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=i+1
vj
≥ w({1, . . . , k − 1} ∪ {i, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′} ∪ {(i+ 1)′, . . . ,m′})
= wA({1, . . . , k − 1} ∪ {i, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′} ∪ {(i+ 1)′, . . . ,m′})
+wB({1, . . . , k − 1} ∪ {i, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , k′} ∪ {(i+ 1)′, . . . ,m′})
≥
k−1∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=i+1
ajj + aik +
k−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=i
bjj+1 + bm1,
where the last inequality holds because
µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{1,...,k−1}∪{i+1,...,m} ∪ {(i, k)}
is a matching for coalition
({1, . . . , k − 1} ∪ {i, . . . ,m}) ∪ ({1′, . . . , k′} ∪ {(i+ 1)′, . . . ,m′}),
and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{1,...,k−1}∪{i,...,m−1} ∪ {(m, 1)}
is a matching for the same coalition.
Let us now consider the game wB. An optimal matching for the matrix B is µ2 =
{(i, i+ 1)}i=1,...,m−1 ∪ {(m, 1)} and we already have, from (9), that u2i + v2i+1 = bii+1,
for all i = 1, . . . ,m− 1, and u2m + v21 = bm1.
Further, we show now that u2i + v
2
k ≥ bik where i, k ∈ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, k 6= i + 1.
First we consider i+ 1 < k. By (13) and (15),
u2i + v
2
k =
(
−
m∑
j=i+1
uj − v1 + bm1 +
m−1∑
j=i
bjj+1 −
m∑
j=i+1
vj +
m∑
j=i+1
ajj + a11 − u11
)
+
( m∑
j=k
uj + v1 − bm1 −
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
m∑
j=k
vj −
m∑
j=k
ajj − a11 + u11
)
= −
k−1∑
j=i+1
uj +
k−1∑
j=i
bjj+1 −
k−1∑
j=i+1
vj +
k−1∑
j=i+1
ajj.
Thus, u2i + v
2
k ≥ bik with i+ 1 < k is equivalent to
k−1∑
j=i+1
uj +
k−1∑
j=i+1
vj ≤
k−1∑
j=i+1
ajj +
k−1∑
j=i
bjj+1 − bik.
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By substracting from the efficiency condition, we obtain
i∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k
uj +
i∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k
vj ≥
i∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k
ajj +
i−1∑
j=1
bjj+1+
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1+ bm1+ bik.
Since (u, v) ∈ C(w), we get
i∑
j=1
uj +
m∑
j=k
uj +
i∑
j=1
vj +
m∑
j=k
vj
≥ w({1, . . . , i} ∪ {k, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , i′} ∪ {k′, . . . ,m′})
= wA({1, . . . , i} ∪ {k, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , i′} ∪ {k′, . . . ,m′})
+wB({1, . . . , i} ∪ {k, . . . ,m}, {1′, . . . , i′} ∪ {k′, . . . ,m′})
≥
i∑
j=1
ajj +
m∑
j=k
ajj +
i−1∑
j=1
bjj+1 +
m−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 + bm1 + bik,
where the last inequality holds because now, µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{1,...,i}∪{k,...,m} is a match-
ing for the coalition
({1, . . . , i} ∪ {k, . . . ,m}) ∪ ({1′, . . . , i′} ∪ {k′, . . . ,m′}),
and µ′2 = {(j, j + 1)}j∈{1,...,i−1}∪{k,...,m−1} ∪ {(i, k), (m, 1)}
is a matching for the same coalition.
Finally, for the case i+ 1 > k we know from (13) and (15) that
u2i + v
2
k =
i∑
j=k
uj −
i−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 +
i∑
j=k
vj −
i∑
j=k
ajj.
Thus, u2i + v
2
k ≥ bik with i+ 1 > k is equivalent to
i∑
j=k
uj +
i∑
j=k
vj ≥
i∑
j=k
ajj +
i−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 + bik.
Since (u, v) ∈ C(w),
i∑
j=k
uj +
i∑
j=k
vj ≥ w({k, . . . , i}, {k′, . . . , i′})
= wA({k, . . . , i}, {k′, . . . , i′}) + wB({k, . . . , i}, {k′, . . . , i′})
≥
i∑
j=k
ajj +
i−1∑
j=k
bjj+1 + bik,
where the last inequality follows because µ′1 = {(j, j)}j∈{k,...,i} is a matching for
the coalition {k, . . . , i} ∪ {k′, . . . , i′} and, for the same coalition, µ′2 = {(j, j +
1)}j∈{k,...i−1} ∪ {(i, k)} is also a matching.
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As it is shown by Corollary 8, the addition of any assignment game wB and a
glove market wA is again an assignment game wA +wB. Now, as a first consequence
of Theorem 10, we can even state that the core of that assignment game, wA + wB,
is precisely the sum of the cores of both games, wA and wB.
Corollary 11. Let (M1 ∪M2, wA) be a glove market, then C(wA + wB) = C(wA) +
C(wB) for all assignment game (M1 ∪M2, wB).
Proof. Since all matchings are optimal for glove markets, we can always choose one
of them, say µA, such that µA ∩ µB = ∅, where µB is an optimal matching of B,
which is the matrix correponding to the assignment game wB. Then, we are under
the assumptions of Theorem 10 and therefore the core of the sum game is the sum of
the two cores, that is to say C(wA + wB) = C(wA) + C(wB).
Moreover, as a consequence of Theorem 10, under the same assumptions, the
opposition of interests of both sides of the market is somehow recovered. In the
buyers-optimal core allocation each seller receives his minimum core payoff and in
the sellers-optimal core allocation each buyer receives her minimum core payoff.
Corollary 12. Let (M1 ∪ M2, wA) and (M1 ∪ M2, wB) be two assignment games,
obtained from matrices A and B respectively, such that there exist µ1 an optimal
matching for matrix A and µ2 an optimal matching for matrix B such that µ1∩µ2 = ∅.
Let w = wA + wB.
Then, in (u, v) defined as in Proposition 9, each buyer receives her minimum core
payoff and in (u, v) each seller receives his minimum core payoff.
Proof. By Theorem 10, under the assumptions of the corollary, we have C(w) =
C(wA) + C(wB).
Let us denote by (u1, v1) and (u2, v2) the sellers-optimal core allocation of the
games w1 and w2.
Since (u1, v1) + (u2, v2) = (u, v) ∈ C(w) we know that buyer i ∈ M1 can attain
the payoff u1i + u
2
i in C(w).
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If there existed (u, v) ∈ C(w) such that ui < u1i + u2i , since (u, v) ∈ C(w) =
C(wA) + C(wB), there would exist (u
1, v1) ∈ C(wA) and (u2, v2) ∈ C(wB) such that
(u, v) = (u1, v1) + (u2, v2).
From ui = u
1
i +u
2
i < u
1
i +u
2
i follows that either u
1
i < u
1
i or u
2
i < u
2
i in contradiction
with the fact that u1i is the minimum core payoff of player i in the game wA and u
2
i
is the minimum core payoff of player i in the game wB.
The above corollary is concerned with the sum of two assignment games (M1 ∪
M2, wA) and (M1∪M2, wB) with associated matrices A and B, respectively, such that
there exist two optimal matchings, one for each matrix, that have no pair in common.
Next, it is considered the case where the two optimal matchings, one for each
matrix A and B, have a coincident pair (i, µ(i)). In such a case, it is proved that
the minimum core payoff, mi, of the player i in the sum game w = wA + wB is
mi = u
1
i + u
2
i , where u
1
i and u
2
i are the minimum payoffs of the player i in the cores
of the assignment games wA and wB, respectively.
Proposition 13. Let (M1 ∪M2, wA) and (M1 ∪M2, wB) be two assignment games
with corresponding matrices A = (aij) i∈M1
j∈M2
and B = (bij) i∈M1
j∈M2
such that there is a
player i ∈ M1 ∪M2 that is optimally matched to a same player in both games. Let
w = wA +wB be the sum game and let mi be the minimum core payoff of player i in
the sum game. Then,
mi = u
1
i + u
2
i
Proof. In this proof, we only consider i ∈M1 since the proof for i ∈M2 is analogous.
Let i ∈M1 be a player such that µ1(i) = µ2(i) = j, where µ1 is an optimal matching
of A and µ2 is an optimal matching of B. Since wA and wB are assignment games,
by Demange (1982) and Leonard (1983), the minimum payoff that player i gets in
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C(wA) is u
1
i = aij − bwAj and, in C(wB), it is u2i = bij − bwBj . Then,
u1i + u
2
i = aij − bwAj + bij − bwBj
= aij − (wA(M1 ∪M2)− wA(M1 ∪M2\{j}))
+bij − (wB(M1 ∪M2)− wB(M1 ∪M2\{j}))
= aij + bij − (w(M1 ∪M2)− w(M1 ∪M2\{j}))
= aij + bij − bwj
= wA({i, j}) + wB({i, j})− bwj
= w({i, j})− bwj
(17)
Let us suppose that x ∈ C(w) and xi < w({i, j})− bwj . Since the maximum core
payoff of any player is his marginal contribution to the grand coalition, for player j and
for all x ∈ C(w), it holds that xj ≤ bwj . Therefore,
xi < w({i, j}) − bwj ≤ w({i, j}) − xj. So, xi + xj < w({i, j}) which leads us to
a contradiction since x belongs to C(w). Thus, u1i + u
2
i is the minimum core payoff
for player i.
It remains open whether the above property holds for all players of an arbitrary
sum of two assignment games.
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